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1. Introduction 
 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the largest cash assistance program in the 
US and has become the centerpiece of anti-poverty initiatives.  In 2011, 26.5 million 
people received $60.7 billion in the form of reduced taxes and tax refunds (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2013).  
Beginning with its inception in 1975 and through a number of expansions in both 
Democratic and Republican administrations, the EITC has been promoted to achieve 
four goals: (1) Reduce poverty, especially childhood poverty (2) Reduce reliance on 
welfare programs, (3) Provide an incentive to work by subsidizing low wages, and 
(4) provide relief from regressive payroll taxes.  Current discussions suggest 
expanding the EITC rather than raising the minimum wage as a way to help the 
working poor (Roemer, 2013).  
However, the structure of the EITC does not serve the needs of low-income people 
with disabilities as well as it serves low income people without disabilities and any 
changes to the program must recognize the disparate impact it may have on them.  
The EITC could be refined to become a more effective vehicle for reducing poverty 
or encouraging work among people with disabilities.  
Based on an analysis of the Current Population Survey, we find that people with 
disabilities are almost as likely to claim the EITC as those without disabilities but get 
a much lower average benefit.  While the average annual benefit for people without 
disabilities is $2,072, the average for people with disabilities is $1,301 and more 
than 60 percent benefit by less than $500.  
This disparity is caused by a mismatch between the structure of the program and 
two important socio-economic characteristics of the disability population:  First, the 
EITC is designed to reduce poverty, especially childhood poverty, and discourage 
the use of welfare programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).  As a 
result, the EITC offers a much larger benefit for workers with “qualifying children” 
than for those with either no children or children who are older than 19.  People 
with disabilities tend to be older and are less likely to have qualifying children.    
Second, the credit is designed to encourage work and accordingly the amount of the 
credit is calculated as a percentage of wages or “earned income.”  Low income 
people with disabilities are more likely to receive income from Social Security, 
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Supplemental Security Income and Veterans benefits and other sources that cannot 
be counted in the calculation so the benefits are a much lower percentage of their 
total income.  
This paper provides an overview of the EITC, describes the methodology and 
limitations of our approach, reports findings from our analysis of the Current 
Population Survey, and discusses recommendations to modify the program so that 
the program’s structure corresponds more closely to the needs of people with 
disabilities. 
1. Purpose and Structure of the EITC 
The EITC has been used to promote four main objectives:  
• Increase the incentive to work by supplementing earnings from low-paid 
work.  
• Reduce poverty, especially childhood poverty. 
• Reduce reliance on welfare programs. 
• To a lesser extent, to offset the rising Social Security and Medicare payroll 
taxes for low-income families.  
Tension exits between the EITC’s role as an antipoverty program and its role as a 
work incentive.  As an antipoverty program alternative to welfare, it makes sense to 
target the benefit to families with children because (1) low-income single people 
may live in households that are not low-income and (2) families are more likely to 
qualify for other welfare programs.  However, as a work incentive or an attempt to 
offset payroll taxes, the EITC would be more effective if it included a more 
significant benefit for childless workers (Gitterman et al., 2007) 
 
a. History of the EITC 
The EITC was developed in 1975 as the result of two compromises.  First, the Nixon 
administration had proposed a negative income tax that would provide a refundable 
credit to all low-income individuals and families as an alternative to a welfare 
system.  Concerned that this approach would reduce the incentive to work, the 
House and Senate focused on limiting the credit to workers.  Second, the House saw 
the credit predominantly as a way to offset the payroll taxes of low-income workers 
and increase the compensation from low-wage work and thus proposed that it be 
available to all low-wage workers.  The Senate on the other hand saw the credit in 
terms of welfare reform and argued to limit the credit to workers with children in 
order to more effectively target the program and limit its cost.    
For most of its history, the EITC has enjoyed bipartisan support.  Congress made the 
EITC permanent in 1978 and expanded it in 1986 and 1990. President Reagan called 
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it “the best antipoverty, the best pro-family, the best job creation measure to come 
out of Congress.”  The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 doubled the size of the 
credit was doubled and a small credit.  In addition, in response to evidence that the 
marginal tax rate of poor childless workers had grown sharply from 1980 to 1993 
due to increases in Social Security, gasoline and excise taxes, the Act included a 
small credit workers without qualifying children (Greenstein and Shapiro, 1998; 
Hotz, 2003).  
President Clinton touted the EITC as a central element to the 1996 welfare reform.   
The larger increase for taxpayers with two or more children was necessary to meet 
President Clinton's 1992 campaign promise that no family with a fulltime worker 
would be poor. 
In 2001, the structure of the EITC was modified to relieve the marriage penalty by 
extending the phase-out range for married couples.  In 2009, the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act temporarily increased the credit for families with 3 or more 
children and expanded eligibility for married couples.  Neither modification 
expanded the credit for childless workers.  
In 2011, 26.5 million people claimed the credit and received $60.7 billion in reduced 
taxes or refunds (Internal Revenue Service, 2012) and it has shown positive results.  
It has lifted an estimated 6.6 million people above the poverty line (half of whom 
were children) (Wancheck and Greenstein, _____). In addition, studies have found 
evidence that the EITC has resulted in increased work effort among single mothers 
but has a less clear impact on the work effort of men and married women (Hotz et 
al., 2006).  People with disabilities show a similar pattern. The EITC increased labor 
force participation among single mothers with disabilities, decreased labor force 
participation among married women with disabilities and did not affect the 
participation among men with disabilities (Huang and Schmeiser, 2009). 
Other studies argue that although the EITC raises families up to the poverty level in 
the short-term, it does not provide the support needed to enable recipients to build 
assets, allow for upward mobility or make a meaningful improvement in the 
wellbeing of low-income families and workers (Jeroslow 2012, Alsott 2009). 
 
b. Structure  
The EITC is structured in three stages: A phase-in period where the value of the 
credit increases as a percent of earned income; a plateau where the value of the 
credit reaches a maximum and levels off; and, a phase out period where the value 
decreases as income increases until it reaches zero.  Each of these phases has 
different levels based on the worker’s number of children and type of filing status 
(single or married filing jointly).  (Figure 1) 
For example, an individual with three children qualifies for a credit that is the 
equivalent to 45 percent of wages up to a maximum of $5,891 and begins to taper 
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off as their wage exceeds $17,090 and ends when income exceeds $45,062.  This is 
in stark contrast to a childless worker who is eligible for a credit of 7.5 percent of 
wages up to a maximum of $475 and tapers off if their wage exceeds $13,980 
(Figure 1). 
In order to be considered a “qualifying child” for the credit, the child must meet a 
relationship test (son, daughter, stepchild, brother, sister, niece, grandchild etc.) and 
be either (1) under age 19 (2) a full-time student or younger than the worker, or (3) 
be “permanently and totally disabled.” 
 
Figure 1: Earned Income Tax Credit for couples filing jointly, 2012 
 
 
Unlike most credits in the tax code, the EITC is refundable, that is, the credit reduces 
the individual’s tax liability and if the credit exceeds the amount of taxes owed, the 
family receives a tax refund.  Tax filers can receive the refund either by check or 
direct deposit.  
Those opting for direct-deposit may have the refund split and deposited into 
multiple accounts. This “split refund” option is designed to make it easier for tax 
filers to deposit some of their refund directly into savings accounts and asset 
development opportunities when they file their return.   
The credit is available to all individuals and couples, regardless of age, who have 
qualifying children.  However, the benefit is not available to workers under age 25 


















In 23 states, workers that qualify for the federal EITC can also claim a refundable 
credit on state income taxes.  These state EITC programs are valued at $2 billion. 
c. Rules that are particularly relevant for people with disabilities 
Benefits such as Social Security Disability Insurance, SSI, or military disability 
pensions are not considered earned income and cannot be used to claim the EITC.  
Beneficiaries of these programs may qualify for the credit only if they, or their 
spouse if filing a joint return, have other earned income. Private disability benefits 
are considered earned income if the taxpayer is under the minimum retirement age. 
(IRS, u.d.)   
Receipt of the EITC does not generally reduce the worker’s access to other benefits 
because federal and state EITC payments are not considered as income for most 
public benefits including Medicaid, SSI, SSDI, Food Stamps, or federally assisted 
housing programs.  However, treatment of EITC payments in calculating assets 
varies across programs and states.  For example, EITC payments are completely 
excluded from the resource test for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (food 
stamps), they are excluded from the resource test for SSI for nine months following 
the month the refund is received, and there is variation among states in how EITC 
payments are counted by State Medicaid agencies and other cash assistance 
programs.    
d. Limitations of the EITC for people with disabilities 
The EITC is at the heart of the current safety net for low-income families but it has 
significant limitations for people with disabilities.  
The EITC has limited value for people without qualifying children.  The 
maximum benefit of $457 for workers without qualifying children is one-thirteenth 
the $5,891 maximum for a worker with three children even though workers without 
qualifying children (e.g. non-custodial parents, parents with older children and 
childless individuals and couples), especially those with disabilities, often have a 
tenuous attachment to the labor force and are at significant risk of financial 
insecurity. Expanding the EITC to this population could increase the rewards of 
work and thus the labor market attachment of workers without qualifying children, 
as it has done for women with children, and could bring their incomes above the 
poverty line (Gitterman et al. 2007). In addition, the low value of EITC for this group 
offsets only less than half of the earnings that are deducted for payroll taxes 
(Gitterman 2007).  
The EITC puts downward pressure on wages.  Leigh (2010) documented that a 
10 percent increase in the generosity of the EITC is associated with a 5 percent fall 
in the wages of high school dropouts and a 2 percent fall in the wages of those with 
only a high school diploma, while having no effect on the wages of college graduates. 
This downward pressure affects low-wage workers equally regardless of the 
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amount of credit they are able to claim.  This is particularly problematic for workers 
with disabilities who are more likely to be eligible only for the low childless credit.  
Transition-age workers without children are ineligible for the EITC.  Childless 
workers qualify for the EITC only if they are between the ages of 25 and 64.  It 
excludes young workers who are just entering the labor market and making major 
decisions about work (Gitterman et al. 2007).  This may be especially problematic 
for young adults with disabilities who are just entering the labor market who may 
need an additional work incentive to offset the extra costs of working and the 
disincentives of the SSI program, which ties eligibility to low earnings and 
resources.  
The EITC does not provide support for people who are not working or are 
working only intermittently.  The value of the EITC is based on earnings.  People 
with disabilities who, because of a work limitation, are more likely to work part-
time, on a reduced work schedule or intermittently will be eligible for a lower claim 
than if they were able to work full-time and people who are not working can claim 
the EITC only if their spouse is working.  The 2011 American Community Survey 
estimates that approximately 28.6% of persons with disabilities who worked did so 
on a part-time basis (34 hours or less per week). This compares to 17.1% of 
working persons without disabilities who worked part-time. 
Some eligible low-income workers with disabilities may not be claiming their 
EITC.  While no rigorous studies have estimated the participation rate among 
eligible workers with disabilities, Plueger (2009) estimated use of the program of 
taxpayers in general and found that 75 percent of eligible workers claimed the EITC 
--81 percent of those with qualifying children and 55 percent of taxpayers without 
children. Some evidence suggests that the participation rate has been rising year to 
year with a 79 percent participation rate in 2007 (Holt, 2011).  
Tax laws, including the EITC, do not take into account the extra cost of living 
with a disability. People with disabilities tend to require more resources to meet 
basic needs than those without disabilities.  Their physical or mental limitation 
might require them to spend more on , for example, housing, home care, 
modifications, transportation, health care, and work-related expenses.  Although 
these additional costs vary significantly, She and Livermore (2006) estimate that, on 
average an individual with a work limitation would need an annual income of about 
$31,000 to experience material hardship (including the ability to meet expenses; 
ability to pay rent or mortgage and utility bills; ability to obtain needed medical and 
dental care; and food insecurity) at the same rate as a similar person with no 
disability with an annual income at the poverty level of $10,160 in 2005.  Tax policy 
does not account for this difference (Seto & Buhai, 2005). 
The inconsistent and confusing calculations of whether EITC refunds count as 
assets for other safety net programs may discourage savings.  Research 
suggests that asset limits in safety net programs decreases savings in part because 
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Our analysis uses micro-data from the March 2012 Current Population Survey to 
estimate the use of the EITC and the value of the benefit for people with and without 
disabilities.  Although the CPS is the best data source available for this type of 
analysis, both the definition of disability and the calculation of the EITC introduce 
inaccuracies in the final results.  
a. Definition of disability 
We categorized respondents into two categories--“disability” or “no disability”- 
based on whether they answered yes to at least one of the following six disability 
questions that CPS added to the questionnaire in 2008.   
• Is this person deaf or does he or she have serious difficulty hearing? 
• Is this person blind or does he or she have serious difficulty seeing even 
when wearing glasses? 
• Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition, does this person have 
serious difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions? 
• Does this person have serious difficulty walking or climbing stairs? 
• Does this person have difficulty dressing or bathing? 
• Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition, does this person have 
difficulty doing errands alone such as visiting a doctor’s office or shopping? 
 
This is the standard definition of disability that the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses in 
computing labor force statistics and it is comparable to other federal surveys. 
However it has several limitations.  First, it excludes the population living in 
institutions such as prisons and long term care facilities as well as those on active 
duty in the Armed Forces.  In addition, research suggests that these questions may 
underestimate the size of the disability population and may not adequately capture 
DI and SSI participants (Burkauser et al., 2012).   
 
b. Imputation of EITC 
The CPS asks respondents to report a variety of household, family and individual 
characteristics including income from various sources but it does not solicit 
information about taxes and tax credits. Instead, the US Census Bureau simulates tax 
liabilities and tax credits using reported information on family relationships and 
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income (O’Hara, 2004).  Although data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
provide better information on numbers of recipients and credit amounts, it does not 
have disability information and thus cannot be used for our purposes.  
According to the IRS, $60.7 billion was allocated to 27.5 million people in 2011 
whereas our CPS analysis finds that $43 billion was allocated to 21.1 million people.  
Thus, our analysis significantly underestimates the number of people and the total 
value of the benefit.  This is a well-known problem with the CPS (Meyer, 2007).   
For the purpose of this analysis, we assume that the scale of the underestimate does 
not vary by disability status.  However, this may be a questionable assumption.  
Because the CPS imputes the EITC based on reported characteristics, it does not 
allow us to measure the actual take-up rate and if the take-up rate differs by 
disability status, our estimates will be biased.  
As a result, although we discuss the percent of individuals claiming the EITC by 
disability status, we focus most of the analysis on the amount of the EITC benefit.   In 
addition, we refer to people “eligible” for the EITC rather than to people who “claim” 
the benefit.  
3. Findings  
a. Use of the EITC among people with disabilities 
According to the CPS, overall, working age people with disabilities are roughly 
equally likely to be eligible for the EITC than people without disabilities (10% 
compared with 11%).  However, low-income people with disabilities are much less 
likely to be eligible.  For example, 14 percent of people with disabilities with 
incomes under the official poverty line are eligible for the EITC compared with 31 
percent of people without disabilities. This finding is directly related to the 
structure of the program.  People with disabilities are much less likely to be working 
and have earned income (a prerequisite for eligibility) than people without 
disabilities but if they are working, they are more likely to be in lower paid jobs that 
qualify them for the EITC.  
It is important to note that because of the CPS underestimate, the actual percentage 
of people in each group eligible for the EITC is somewhat higher than the values 
reported but the comparison between those with and without disabilities is valid.  
 
Table 1: Average EITC use among people with and without 
disabilities age 18-64 by Poverty Level, 2012 
Percent eligible for the 
EITC** 
Average amount of EITC 
among eligibles 
With No  With No  
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Disability Disability Disability Disability 
All 10% 11% * $1,301 $2,073 * 
Tax Filers 18% 13% * $1,296 $2,064 * 
Income as a Percent 
of the Poverty Level 
Under 100%  14% 31% * $1,248 $2,353 * 
100%-150%  17% 35% * $1,736 $2,557 * 
150%-200%  16% 25% * $1,354 $1,844 * 
Over 200%  4% 3% * $846 $1,218 * 
Source: Authors computation from March 2012 Current Population Survey 
microdata. 
* indicates that the difference in the average value in the disability category 
compared to the no disability category is statistically significant  at the 95% 
confidence level. 
** The CPS underestimates the percent eligible for the EITC but the relative 
value between disability categories is likely valid.  
 
Among those claiming the credit, people with disabilities qualify for a much lower 
benefit ($1,301) compared with people with no disability ($2,073) (Table 1). This 
discrepancy is apparent in all age groups and all income levels as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Average EITC among people with and without disabilities 
age 18-64 by selected characteristics, 2012 
Average amount of EITC among 
eligibles 
With Disability No Disability  
Age Group 
18-24 $2,131 $2,419 
25-34 $1,490 $2,077 * 
35-44 $1,881 $2,448 * 
45-54 $1,282 $1,858 * 
55-64 $544 $1,007 * 
Worked in past year    
Yes $1,194 $2,016 * 
No $1,609 $2,522 * 
Household Income Category 
$5,000 or less $393 $567 * 
$5,001-$10,000 $731 $1,304 * 
$10,001-$20,000 $1,267 $2,581 * 
$20,001-$30,000 $1,791 $2,856 * 
$30,001-$40,000 $1,491 $2,086 * 
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$40,001-$50,000 $1,514 $1,626 
Over $50,000 $1,117 $1,547 * 
Number of children under 
18 in household    
0 $376 $455 * 
1 $1,773 $1,977 * 
2 $2,742 $2,895  
3 or more $3,113 $3,304  
Note: Non-workers may be in households with workers 
* indicates that the difference in the average value in the disability category 
compared to the no disability category is statistically significant  at the 95% 
confidence level. 
Source: Authors computation from March 2012 Current Population Survey 
microdata. 
 
This disparity is the result of two important factors:  
a. People with disabilities are disproportionately older and are much less likely 
to have children under 19 who are living at home.  More than half (54%) of 
EITC recipients with disabilities have no qualifying children compared with 
26 percent of recipients with no disability.   Among people under 65, two-
thirds of people with disabilities are 45-64 compared to just 18 percent of 
people with no disabilities and the eligible are also older with 54% of people 
with disabilities in this age group compared with 28 percent of people with 
no disability. (Appendix A)  They might have fewer qualifying children 
because they have fewer children to begin with, or because their children 
have aged out of the qualifying range.  The data do not allow us to make this 
distinction.  
b. People with disabilities are more likely to have income that cannot be 
counted toward the EITC such as Social Security, Supplemental Security 
Income, retirement income and veterans payments than those without 
disabilities.  Thus, for a given level of household income, less of it can be 
matched with the EITC. (Appendix B) 
These two factors lead to a situation in which 60 percent of people with disabilities 
get a benefit of less than $500 while only 10 percent benefit by over $4,000. (Figure 
2) 
Figure 2: Distribution of EITC Benefit by Disability Status, 2012 
 4. Conclusion and Recommendations
As currently structured, the EITC is not 
people with disabilities as it is for low income people without 
income people with disabilities 
people without disabilities and those who are eligible tend to receive 
smaller benefit.   
Disability advocacy groups should guard against e
alternative to raising the minimum wage unless the credit for childless workers is 
expanded.   
Expanding the EITC amount for workers without qualifying children would help 
mediate this disparity.   Any
The American Clean Energy and Security bill
EITC for childless workers but the bill was not passed (Edelman et al., 2009).
In order to target the program and minimize its cost, Congress could develop 
specialized EITC options for people with disabilities
childless credit for workers with disabilities and/or
below age 25 with disabilities
appeals of the current system is that it is administratively simple and operated 
within the tax system.  Including a system to determine disability would complicate 
the program unless it relied on the SSI/SSDI disability determination system.   This 
approach would limit the benefit to SSI/SSDI beneficiaries
efficient and direct to address that population through the work incentives within 
those programs rather than je
example, SSA could revise the current system SSI system of deducting $1 in benefits 











as effective an anti-poverty program 
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More could be done to link the EITC to asset building options such as matched 
savings accounts for education and training, homeownership, retirement, and 
entrepreneurship or to connect EITC refunds to SSA’s Plans to Achieve Self Support 
(PASS). An approach with more universal appeal and potential political support 
would be to lower the age of eligibility to 18 for all youth with and without 
disabilities to build behaviors that support work and reduced reliance on social 
security benefits. A second tenet of such a change would be to permanently 
disregard an EITC refund from any public benefit resource testing and thus 
encourage long term saving. 
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Appendix A:  Characteristics of the Population and of EITC Eligibles, 
by Disability Status, 2012 CPS 









Number of people 15 million  177 million  1.5 million  19.6 million  
Tax Filing Status     
Filer 55% 86% 99% 98% 
Non-Filer 45% 14% 1% 2% 
Age Group 
18-24 7% 16% 3% 9% 
25-34 11% 22% 20% 36% 
35-44 15% 21% 22% 28% 
45-54 28% 22% 30% 19% 
55-64 39% 18% 24% 9% 
Worked in past year     
Yes 32% 77% 74% 89% 
No 68% 23% 26% 11% 
Household Income 
Category 
$5,000 or less 6% 3% 6% 3% 
$5,001-$10,000 9% 2% 10% 7% 
$10,001-$20,000 17% 6% 24% 19% 
$20,001-$30,000 13% 8% 21% 21% 
$30,001-$40,000 11% 9% 17% 19% 
$40,001-$50,000 9% 9% 8% 12% 
Over $50,000 35% 63% 14% 20% 
Number of children 
under 18 in 
household 
  
0 75% 56% 54% 26% 
1 13% 19% 22% 30% 
2 8% 16% 13% 26% 





Appendix B: Average EITC amounts based on Household Income 
and Earned Income, by disability status 
Income (Household 
or Earned) category 
and number of 
children 
Average EITC based on 
Household  Income  Category 
Average EITC Based in Earned 









less than $5,000  
0 children $172 $200 $162 $209 * 
1 child  623   881   781   817  
2 children  723   1,001  *  1,143   1,038  
3 +  children  1,057   1,122   1,192   1,060  
$5,001- $10,000  
0  339   436  *  489   427  
1  1,222   1,821  *  2,075   2,343  
2  2,138   2,226   2,202   2,767  
3 or more  2,972   2,126   2,960   2,851  
$10,001-$20,000  
0  315   364   327   437  
1  2,170   2,923  *  2,817   2,969  
2  2,719   4,249  *  3,843   4,619  
3 or more  4,903   4,231  *  4,470   4,852  
$20,001-$30,000  
0  401   623  *  719   858  
1  2,556   2,344   2,331   2,225  
2  3,793   3,941   4,332   3,623  * 
3 or more  3,700   4,340   4,013   4,135  
$30,001-$40,000  
0  464   633   778   751  
1  1,725   1,622   1,325   1,350  
2  2,832   2,544   1,993   2,068  
3 or more  2,868   3,138   2,591   2,798  
$40,001-$50,000  
0  439   617   323   523  
1  1,376   1,591   995   1,718  * 
2  1,837   1,680   1,967   1,569  
3 or more  3,490   2,418  *  1,856   2,313  
Over $50,000  
0  524   379   248   337  
1  1,038   1,586  *  463   1,551  * 
2  2,471   2,167  *  1,932   2,177  
3 or more  1,458   2,605   1,110   2,563  * 
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Appendix C: Components of Average (Mean) Household Income, by 
Disability Status, 2012 CPS 
With Disability No Disability 
Earned Income $33,398 $77,716 
Other income 16,789 9,182 
Social Security 6,604 1,941 
Retirement income 2,620 1,685 
SSI 2,020 277 
Veterans payments 957 256 
Disability income 853 171 
Interest 690 1,067 
Unemployment 641 745 
Rental income 429 625 
Education income 403 840 
Dividends 399 685 
Worker’s compensation 291 104 
Survivor income 236 191 
Financial assistance 191 191 
Public assistance 131 60 
Other   71 62 
Alimony 58 53 
 
 
 
